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Deficits and Financial Change
in the Pacific Basin
Government budget positions in most Pacific
Basin nationsdeteriorated sharply in the aftermath
of the worldwide economic slump of the rnid-
1970s. Budget deficits in the market-oriented
economies ofthe region have since averaged
roughIy4 percentoftheir respective GNPs. Finan-
cingshortfallsofthismagnitude has notproven an
easy task, and, at various times, has been respon-
sible for inflation, disintermediation, and compet-
itive shifts among financial institutions.
This Letterexplains howthe need to finance large
deficits oftentimes has produced the problems
mentioned,and argues that the responses ofthe
market and financial regulatory authorities have
constituted an important, although frequently in-
advertent, impetus to financial innovation and li-
beralization in a numberofPacific Basin nations.
Financing options
Governments have a numberofoptions in finan-
cing budget deficits. Atthe most fundamental lev-
el, fiscal authorities mustchoose between borrow-
ing abroad (i.e., from foreign investors, foreign
banks, or international agencies) and borrowing
from domestic sources. Foreign loans represent a
majorfundingsource for anumberofPacific Basin
nations. Indonesia, forexample, finances virtually
all of its budget deficits abroad. But this Letter will
concentrateon domesticfinancing and its relation
to financial innovation.
When a governmentchooses to finance deficits
domestically, i.t has several options: itcan sell its
debttothecentral bank ("monetize"thedeficit), it
can persuade or require financial institutions to
absorb governmentdebt (turning the institutions
into "captive" sources offunds), oritcandesign a
"marketoriented" approach to selling govern-
ment debt instruments.
Monetary finance
Useofthecentral banktofinance deficits involves
increasing bank reserves, which in turn leads to
increases in the stock ofmoney. Ultimately, the
private sector finances the budgetdeficitby in-
creasing its holdings of non-interest bearing
claims -typically consisting ofcurrency and
bank reserves or "base money"-on the central
bank at the expense of interest-bearing claims di-
rectly issued bythe government. All countries in
the Pacific Basin region have at differenttimes
monetized varying portions oftheir deficits.
The majordrawbacks to financing sizable deficits
through base money creation, ofcourse, are its
inflationary consequences forthe economy.
Among these consequences are distortions in the
financial sector. The specific regulatory environ-
ment, includingthe structure ofinterest rate con-
trols, determines the extentto which these distor-
tions adversely affect the entire financial system,
financial intermediaries as a group, or various
groups ofspecialized financial institutions within
the financial system. Forexample, depositinterest
rate ceilings existing in most Pacific Basin coun-
tries are more likelyto hold yields at regulated
depository institutions below market-determined
returns duringperiods ofhigh inflation, and there-
fore cause financial disintermediation. Investors
in these circumstances turn to such alternatives as
investments in real assets and unregulated finan-
cial instruments.
Regulated institutions faced with a deteriorating
competitive position may respond by designing
newfinancial instruments offering marketyields
in an attemptto circumvent interest rate controls.
Unregulated institutions may react by offering
new instrumentsdesigned to maximizetheoppor-
tunities availablefrom theirnewlyfound competi-
tive advantage. Financial authorities also are likely
to respond at some pointoutofconcern forthe
adverse effects ofdisintermediation on monetary
control and the continued stabilityofthe banking
system. Segments ofthe financial sector that do
not benefit immediatelyfromongoing changes
will very li~ely lobbyfor a return to theirformer
competitive position. In the end, the authorities
have a numberofchoices: seek alternative means
offinancing deficits, liberalize the structure of
interest rate controls or, in contrast, tighten and
extend interest rate controls to covervirtuallyall
financial institutions and markets.FRBSF
New Zealand is a primeexampleofacountry
where borrowingfrom the central bank has often
been the "residual" form ofdeficitfinancing, Le.,
the authorities have usually resorted to monetizing
its debtwhen otherforms ofborrowing, such as
below-market pricing in governmentdebt instru-
ments, have yielded insufficientfunds. Problems
with monetary control have followed. In most
years since 1975, the state ofthe budget has been
the largest influence on monetary growth. Conse-
quent high and rising inflation, associated with
"low" interest rate policies and the government's
large creditdemands, combined with disinter-
mediation from the heavily regulated financial in-
dustry, have been primary reasons for the authori-
ties to liberalize interest rate controls. They have
been majorfactors behind NewZealand's bouts
with financial market liberalization in 1976 and
again duringthe past few months.
Captive institutions
The "captive" placementofgovernment debt in-
volves some form of "persuasion" orcoercion by
governmentto induce private financial institu-
tionsto absorb government paper into their port~
folios, or some formal or informal agreement on
the partofgovernment-affiliated financial institu-
tions to purchase given amounts ofgovernment
liabilities.
For example, commercial banks and other finan-
cial institutions in many Pacific Basin countries
are required to hold "secondary" reserves and/or
a certain portion oftheir portfolios in "liquid"
assets. Government bonds orTreasury bills often
satisfy this requirement. A less subtle, although
common, method is simplyto require individual
financial institutions to absorb a given amountof
governmentdebt. Similarly, government-affiliated
financial institutions are often legislated to hold a
major portion, and, in some cases, all oftheir
assets ingovernmentliabilities. Forexample, gov-
ernment pension systems in Malaysia and Singa-
pore are required to hold a significant portion of
their portfolios in government bonds.
Using captive financial institutions to absorb gov-
ernment debthas the advantage of loweringthe
costtothegovernmentofservicing its debt. More-
over, mostPacific Basin nations feel thattheyhave
no domestic option otherthan monetizing their
debt. Theiropen securities markets are typically
underdeveloped or nonexistent. Instead, afew fi-
nancial institutions, usually commercial banks,
dominate mostforms ofinternal finance.
Onedisadvantage ofcaptive finance is that the
institutions forced to absorb relatively large
amounts ofgovernment debtat below-market in-
terest rates are likelyto be putat a competitive
disadvantage relative to "non-captive" institu-
tions. Resulting competitiveshifts between institu-
tions, or between the regulated and unregulated
financial sectors, are likelyto create pressures for
financial and regulatory changes. The authorities
could feel compelled to tighten and extend con-
trols overthefinancial sectortomaintainthecom-
petitive position ofcaptive institutions or perhaps
even to keep them solvent. However, the authori-
ties may also optto lessen the burden on captive
institutionsand resorttootherfinancingchannels.
Japan provides a good example ofthis process.
Historically, ithas relied to a large extent on cap-
tive institutions to finance governmentdeficits.
When long-term "deficitfinance" bonds werefirst
issued in 1975,93 percent ofthe total was under-
written at below-market rates by a syndicate con-
sisting primarilyofthe largest banks. To help stem
the rising concentration ofgovernmentdebt in
theirasset portfolios, theMinistryofFinanceeven-
tually allowed syndicate members to sell govern-
ment bonds to the secondary market after the ini-
tial holding period had expired. The secondary
market in government bonds subsequently devel-
oped rapidly, and often offered yields far exceed-
ingthoseoffered bythe banks on reguIateddepos-
its. The resuItwas ashiftin theflowsoffundsfrom
banks and other financial intermediaries to long-
term government bonds and securities dealers.
The Japanese authorities responded to the declin-
ing market share ofbanks by allowingthem to
issue large denomination certificates ofdeposit
(CDs) to attract business funds. (The Japanese au-
thorities also were acting in response to pressure
to eliminate discrimination against foreign banks.
ByopeningtheCDmarketin 1979,theysubstanti-
ally improved these banks' access to yen funds.)
Japanese authorities also have attempted to reduce
the burden on banks by raising the yields on pri-
mary government securities to levels that more
fully reflect market-determined yields and byal-
lowingmore frequent changes in bank lending
rates. Moreover, banks have responded to the in-
creased competition forfunds byoffering "general
accounts" to individuals. These accounts operateas demand deposits in thatthey can be overdrawn
usingtimedeposits as collateral. Thus, timedepos-
its yielding higher interest rates than those avail-
able (set by regulators at low levels) on demand
deposits are operating as transactions accounts.
Marketfinance
In contrastto finance bycaptive institutions, the
distinguishing characteristic ofa market-oriented
approach is that private individuals and institu-
tions, and public institutions behaving in a man-
ner similarto private financial institutions, volun-
tarily hold governmentdebt. Thus, a necessary
precondition for "market" placement is a struc-
ture of interest rates on governmentdebt instru-
ments that is competitive with alternative uses
offunds.
A majoradvantageoffollowingamarket-oriented
approach is thatthegovernmentplaces itselfon an
equal footing with other borrowers in the credit
markets. In this way, the governmentpays the cost
ofits borrowing-the yield that society could
have earned by placing the funds in alternative
investments. One political disadvantage, of
course, is thatthecostofgovernmentborrowing is
not disguised as it is through captive financing or
monetization. Moreover, even a market-oriented
approach to government deficitfinancing is likely
ultimatelyto create tensions in the financial system
and spurfurther financial change.
Several Pacific Basin governments have tried to
enhancethe marketabiIityoftheir debts by offer-
ing competitive interest rates and by introducing
attractivenewtypesoffinancial instruments. Mal-
aysia, Thailand, and NewZealand have offered
bonds at various times that are indexed to infla-
tion, that are small in denomination, that have
relatively short maturities, that feature variable in-
terest rate yields, and that offerthe possibilityof
early redemption.
The offshoot in some instances has been greater
interest rate flexibility, i.e. more frequent changes
in interest rates in response to market conditions,
and more competitive pricingof investment in-
struments bythe private sector as itcompetes with
the governmentfor funds. Thai authorities, for
example, have in recentyears triedto increasethe
attractiveness ofgovernmentsecurities tothe non-
bank private sector in a variety ofways. These
include allowing more frequent changes in bank
depositand lending rates and paying yields on
goverment bonds that more closely approach free
marketrates. The resuIthas been the availabiIityof
a greater numberoffinancial instruments with
market rates of interestto Thai investors. In addi-
tion, thedesireofThai authoritiestohelp increase
the liquidityofgovernment bonds held by com-
mercial banks and other financial institutions led
them to establish a governmentbond repurchase
market.
Although many Pacific Basin governments have
gradually or, in the recent case ofNewZealand,
quite rapidly moved to more market-oriented ap-
proaches to financing deficits, these approaches
are likelytogenerate pressures forfurtherfinancial
change. This is particularlytruewheresome inter-
est rate ceilings and credit controls remain in ef-
fect. Securities companies in Japan, forexample,
took advantage ofthe developmentofsecondary
government bond markets and their regulatory
competitive advantage overbanks byoffering in-
vestmenttrustfunds backed bygovernmentbonds
bearing market rates of interest. Their innovation
tookfunds awayfrom banks bound bydepositrate
ceilings and created another source oftension in
thefinancial system. Thistension eventuallycould
lead authorities to allowgreater deposit interest
rate flexibility.
Conclusion
Financing deficits domestically is likelyto distort
the financial system to the extentthatfinancial
regulations and controls are binding regardless of
the channel through which deficits are financed.
The experiences ofseveral Pacific Basin nations
suggest thatthese pressures are likelyto be met
both byfinancial innovation to circumvent bind-
ing controls and by regulatory changes designed
to redress competitive imbalances caused in the
process. In sum, financing large deficits is one
inadvertent force moving a numberof Pacific Ba-
sin nations to a more liberal and competitive fi-
nancial environment.
Michael Hutchison
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 188,356 253 12,331 7.1
Loans and Leases1 6 169,949 420 14,594 9.5
Commercial and Industrial 52,981 - 130 7,018 15.5
Real estate 61,887 244 2,988 5.1
Loans to Individuals 31,780 364 5,129 19.6
Leases 5,079 °
16 0.3
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,347 - 177 - 1,160 - 9.4
OtherSecurities2 7,060 10 - 1,103 - 13.7
Total Deposits 194,368 1,999 3,371 1.7
Demand Deposits 46,289 1,336 - 2,948 - 6.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,138 695 - 1,193 - 3.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 12,635 - 33 - 140 - 1.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,444 696 6,459 5.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 41,091 406 1,494 3.8
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 41,010 342 2,845 7.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,458 797 - 549 - 2.4
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings ,











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change